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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
D. L. ATHERLEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

BULLION MONARCH U R AN I U M
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

8859

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant to quiet title
to an unpatented mining claim known as the Poison Fraction. Defendant-respondent in its answer asserted that
such claim was without any legal or equitable foundation
and sought by counterclaim to quiet its title to four unpatented lode mining claims which, it asserted, covered
all of the area purportedly claimed under the Poison Frac-
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tion location. Subsequently, defendant-respondent moved
for summary judgment quieting its title as against the
plaintiff-appellant in and to one of such claims, the Farmer
John No.3, Mineral Survey 7292, Utah, on which is located
virtually all of respondent's developed mine. By Memorandum Decision of January 27, 1958, and Judgment of
February 17, 1958, the court below granted said motion
for summary judgment.
The parties will be hereinafter referred to as appellant
and respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent's motion for summary judgment conceded,
for the purposes of the motion, that all of the material contentions made by appellant were correct. There is therefore no issue between the parties on this appeal as to any
material fact. The statement of facts contained in appellant's brief, however, is not complete enough to afford the
Court a full understanding of the questions presented and
contains lengthy arguments and assertions relating to facts
already a :lmitted which serve only to confuse the issues.
Respondent therefore deems it necessary to restate the facts.
Before doing so, hovvever, respondent desires to call the
Court's attention to one material misstatement of fact by
appellant. On p:lge 4 of his brief appellant states that the
purported movement of the south line of the Farmer John
No. 3, which was conceded by respondent for the purposes
of the motion for summary judgment, was made "since
1952." This is no doubt an inadvertence since appellant
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states on page 3 of his brief that such movement took place
between 1943 and 1952. In any event, the record is clear
that the corners of the claim have remained in their present position at least since 1952, three years prior to appellant's first attempt to'locate a mining claim in the area (Tr.
11, 50).
All of the facts material to the motion for summary
judgment and this appeal appear in the pleadings and in
appellant's deposition of June 17, 1957, published on October 18, 1957, in the hearing on respondent's motion. References to transcript page refer to said deposition.
The Farmer John No. 3 claim was located in 1943 by
one James M. Sargent who subsequently conveyed his interest therein to Bullion Monarch Uranium Company, Inc.,
the respondent in this case (Tr. 7, 39-40). The mining of
uranium from said claim was the first uranium mining
conducted in the State of Utah (Tr. 36).
Appellant D. L. Atherley first came on the property
covered by the Farmer John No. 3 in 1949, six years after
the location of said claim under the mining laws of the
United States and the State of Utah (Tr. 3, 35). Appellant
worked said claim himself, under contract with respondent
Bullion Monarch Uranium Company, Inc., from 1949 to
1952 and removed during said period of time some ten
thousand tons of ore from the area now in dispute ( Tr. 6-7) .
The Farmer John No. 3 claim was leased in 1954 to
Vanadium Corporation of America, which company has
since worked and developed the mine (Tr. 28-29).
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A·ppellant D. L. Atherley estimates that Three Hundred.
Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) has been expended by
respondent and its lessees and contractors in developing
the area in dispute ( Tr. 44) .
This litigation arose out of a mining claim named the
Poison Fraction located by the appellant. Said claim was
first located in May of 1955 over a small portion of the
eastern part of the Farmer John No.3 (Tr. 14, 17-21). In
1956, appellant amended the location of the Poison Fraction
so that it covered the area presently in dispute as shown
on respondent's Exhibit "A" to appellant's deposition. Respondent's lessee, Vanadium Corporation of America, was
conducting mining operations on the area in dispute at the
time of the location and the amendment of the Poison Fraction by appellant and had been conducting such operations
for some time previously thereto (Tr. 29).
The following facts, all admitted by appellant in his
deposition, are the basis for the motion for summary judgment herein :
1. Appellant does not contend that respondent or its
predecessors in interest have ever failed to do the annual
assessment work required by the mining laws of the United
States and the State of Utah (Tr. 35).
2. Appellant acknowledges that the corners of the
Farmer John No. 3 claim were, at the time of his location
of the Poison Fraction, in the same position that they had
been in since 1952, three years before he first attempted
to locate the Poison Fraction, that such corners (brass cap
U. S. Mineral Survey monuments, Tr. 11) are still in the
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same place that they were in in 1952, that he, the appellant,
knew where said corners were at the time he located and
amended the Poison Fraction, and that he deliberately
staked over said corners (Tr. 11, 50).
3. The Farmer John No. 3 claim, as now staked and
as it has been staked since 1952, under the admitted facts,
included within its limits all the area presently in dispute
(Tr. 49-50).

4. At the time of the location and amendment of the
Poison Fraction by appellant, respondent through its lessee
was in possession of the area in dispute and was conducting mining operations thereon and had been conducting
mining operations thereon for some time previously (Tr.
29).

5. The area which appellant claims in this case covers
substantially all of the developed mine on the Farmer John
No. 3 claim (Tr. 47-48).
Appellant contends that the Farmer John No. 3 claim
was located in 1943 in the north 55° east direction shown
on respondent's Exhibit "A" to appellant's deposition. He
further contends that, some time prior to 1952, the claim
was amended or a new location was made so that the boundaries thereof coincided with the east-west claim as shown
on said Exhibit and as claimed by respondent. There is no
dispute as to the fact that the boundaries as shown by the
east-west claim were established by the Ogden and Shelton
Surveys and that said boundaries have been clearly marked
on the ground since 1952 and that said boundaries have
represented the claim of respondent since 1952.
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Appellant further contends that, since the claim was
originally located as indicated on said Exhibit and since
no amended or relocation notice has even been placed of
record in the County Recorder's Office of Piute County,
respondent cannot now claim and has not legally located
that portion of the ground lying south and east of the location as originally made. Under this theory, appellant in
1955 and 1956 located the Poison Fraction claim as shown
on respondent's Exhibit "A" to appellant's deposition. Appellant contends that the area colored in red on the Exhibit
was at the time of the location of the Poison Fraction, open
public domain. This appeal involves the rights in said
colored portion.
For the purposes of the motion for summary judgment,
and hence on this appeal, respondent is willing to concede
that appellant's contentions are correct. That is, respondent concedes for the purpose of the motion and appeal that
the Farmer John No. 3 claim was originally located in a
northeast-southwest direction as shown on Exhibit "A" and
that, some time prior to 1952, the claim was amended or
a new location was made in accordance with the claim as
presently contended for by respondent and that no amended
or relocation notice was placed of record at the time of said
purported movement. Assuming said facts to be correct,
respondent contended below and contends here that appellant cannot recover as a matter of law.
Briefly stated, the only issue on this appeal is whether
or not a mining locator, with full knowedge of the claim of
a prior claimant, may deliberately stake over the boundaries of said prior claimant while the latter is in possession
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and mining the property claimed, and assert the invalidity
of the prior claim on the sole ground that, many years before, the prior claimant had amended or relocated his claim
without filing of record an amended or relocation certificate.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE LOCATION OF THE CORRECT AND
VALID SOUTH LINE OF THE FARMER JOHN
NO. 3 IS NOT A DISPUTED QUESTION OF
FACT.
POINT II.
CONCEDING ALL OF THE MATERIAL FACTS
CONTENDED FOR BY APPELLANT, APPELLANT CANNOT RECOVER AS A MATTER OF
LAW FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(A)

Respondent Has, With Respect to the Area
in Conflict, Performed Every Act Necessary
to Initiate and Maintain a Right Under the
Mining Laws as Against Appellant.

(B)

Appellant Had No Standing in 1955 or 1956
to Initiate a Valid Mining Claim on the
Area in Conflict.

(C)

Respondent Has Established a Valid Title
to the Farmer John No. 3 Claim as Against
Appellant by Reason of the Fact That it and
its Predecessors in Interest Have Held and
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Worked Said Claim for a Period in Excess
of Seven Years.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOCATION OF THE CORRECT AND
VALID SOUTH LINE OF THE FARMER JOHN
NO. 3 IS NOT A DISPUTED QUESTION OF
FACT.
Point I of appellant's brief is entitled "The Location
of the Correct and Valid South Line of the Farmer John
No. 3 is a Disputed Question of Fact." A reading of appellant's argument under this heading demonstrates clearly
that there is no disputed question of fact. After stating
that such an issue exists in his heading, appellant does not
again refer to the rna tter but argues instead the legal effect
of the facts as admitted. At no point does he refer to any
fact concerning which there is a difference between the
parties. Respondent therefore, except for this brief statement, will likewise devote its argument to the legal issues
presented. The cases cited by appellant under Point I of
its brief, which cases deal with the legal issues, will be
discussed in Point II (A) hereinafter.

POINT II.
CONCEDING ALL OF THE MATERIAL FACTS
CONTENDED FOR BY APPELLANT, APPEL-
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LANT CANNOT RECOVER AS A MATTER OF
LAW FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(A)

Respondent Has, With Respect to the Area
in Conflict, Performed Every Act Necessary
to Initiate and Maintain a Right Under the
Mining Laws as Against Appellant.

The grant of mineral lands on the public domain to
citizens of the United States is contained in and controlled
by the provisions of the Act of May 10, 1872, 30 U.S. C. A.
22, et seq. Said law provides the means by which title to
federal lands are acquired and further provides that locations made there under shall be made in accordance with
the local rules or customs of mining districts in which the
claim is located insofar as the same are applicable and not
inconsistent with the laws of the United States. It has
frequently been held that states also may make such rules
and regulations by statute. There are no local customs or
mining rules or regulations in force with respect to the
ground covered by the claim involved in this lawsuit. The
laws of the State of Utah respecting location will be considered hereinafter.
The only requirements imposed by the federal law
upon the locator of a mining claim on the public domain are
as follows:
1. There must be a discovery of mineral within the
limits of the claim.
2. The location or claim must be distinctly marked
on the ground so that its boundarie~ can be readily traced.
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There is no requirement of posting or recording a location notice or certificate.
The Utah law relating to the location of mining claims
on the public domain provides no additional requirements
insofar as the location itself, as distinguished from the
record of the claim, is concerned. Sections 40-1-1 to 40-1-13,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Said law does provide, however, that, within thirty days after the location of a claim,
a copy of the location notice should be filed of record in
the office of the County Recorder of the county in which
the claim is located. There is no provision relating to
amended location notices or providing for the recording
thereof.
Let us now consider the requirements of the law in
relation to acts of respondent Bullion Monarch Uranium
Company, Inc., with respect to the area in dispute.
'"fhe first requirement, which has frequently been referred to by the courts as "the source of the miner's title,"
is that of discovery. There is no contention in the instant
case that respondent has failed to make a discovery on the
disputed area. In fact, appellant himself, working the area
on a contract with respondent, removed ten thousand tons
of uranium ore therefrom between 1949 and 1952, more
than three years prior to his first attempt to locate a claim
over the area. Moreover, Vanadium Corporation of America
was mining ore from the claim at the very moment that
appellant located his claim thereon (Tr. 29).
The second requirement is that of marking the claim
so that its boundaries can be readily traced. There is no
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contention that this was not done in the present case. Appellant admits that the corners of the claims were placed
in their present positions, so as to cover all of the disputed
area, at least by 1952 and that they have remained in position since that time. He further admits that he was working
the very area that is now in dispute on a contract with
respondent from 1949 to 1952 and that he knew respondent
claimed said area throughout the entire period in question.
Basically, the only proposition relied on by appellant
to sustain his attempt to divest respondent of its very valuable mining property is that the conflict area was open
public domain for the sole reason that respondent failed
to file with the County Recorder a location notice as provided for by Utah law or an amended location notice. Respondent submits that the failure to record such a notice is
immaterial in this case for two reasons:
1. The recording of a notice of location is not requisite to the initiation of title under the mining laws, and
the failure to record such a notice does not forfeit a title
properly initiated.
2. Appellant had actual notice of the claim of respondent and hence cannot complaint of the absence of const1"uctive notice.
For the purpose of this discussion it is important to
distinguish the location of a mining claim from the record
of such clair.a. The locator's title to a mining claim under
the mining laws is initiated by the discovery of mineral
coupled with the segregation of the claim from the public
domain by the marking of the boundaries thereof. As was
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said in Clark-Montana R. Co. v. Butte & Superior Copper
Co., 233 Fed. 547, affirmed 249 U. S. 12:
"A location and its record are different things.
The federal and state statutes distinguish between
them, and the former even in authorizing local rules
'governing the location' and 'manner of recording.'
[30 U. S. C. 28.] The statutory object is to protect
and reward discoverers of mines. Discovery with
intent to claim is the principal thing and vests an
estate-an immediate fixed right of present and
exclusive enjoyment in the discoverers. The record
'is incidental machinery to secure to the discoverer
his reward and to give notice to others. The spirit
of all recordation acts is notice to protect others
against secret equities. If the record is not necessary to create the estate (as it is in the matter of
homestead exemptions and mechanic's liens), the
statute providing for recording is but a direction to
do certain acts and does not create conditions subsequent; and if the statute provides no forfeiture for
failure to reeord, by failure the estate is not divested.
Recordation of mining locations cannot be a condition precedent, for the estate arises before recordation is to be perform.ed." (Emphasis supplied.)
The title to a mining claim is therefore initiated by
discovery and segregation. An estate immediately vests
thereon. In the absence of a provision for forfeiture in
recordation statutes, such statutes do not create conditions
subsequent to the estate. The Utah law does not provide
for forfeiture for failure to record. Respondent therefore
Rubmits that the title initiated by discovery and segregation of the disputed area continued and was in full forc.e
and effect when appellant attempted to locate a mining
claim thereon.
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Other cases holding that the right to a mining claim
will not be forfeited by a failure to record a notice of location, in the absence of a state statute expressly providing
for a forfeiture on that ground, are Jupiter Mining Co. v.
Bodie Consolidated Mining Co., 11 Fed. 666; Dripps v. Allison's Mines Co., 187 Pac. 448; Indiana Nevada Mining Co.
v. Gold Hills Min. & Mill. Co., 126 Pac. 965; Johnson v.
Ryan, 86 P. 2d 1040.
Forfeitures are odious and are not to be implied.
Even if we assume however, contrary to the law as
stated, that recorded notice is requisite to the continuing
validity of a mining claim, appellant herein admits that
he was fully aware of the location claimed by respondent
and that respondent was in possession of the claim at the
very moment when he attempted to initiJte rights thereon.
Therefore, the requirement of notice was fulfilled, and appellant is in no position to complain of the failure to record.
As was stated in Flynn v. Vevelstad, 119 F. Supp. 93, affirmed 230 F. 2d 695 :
"The answer alleges, but only by way of recital,
that the plaintiff had actual notice of the defendant's claims. Proof of this would have been the
equivalent of valid record notice. [Citing numerous
cases.]" (Emphasis supplied.)
In the Supreme Court's decision in the Butte & Superior Company case, supra, the court commented on a previous case that considered a similar question as follows :

"Yosemite Mining Co. v. Emerson was concerned with a regulation of the State of California
which prescribed the manner of the location of a
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claim. The regulation had not been conformed to
and the validity of the location was attacked on that
ground by a subsequent locator who had had notice
of the claim, he contending that there was forfeiture
of it. The contention was rejected and we said, that
to yield to it would work great injustice and subvert
the very purpose for which the posting of notices
was required, which was, we further said, 'to make
known the purpose of the discoverer to claim title
to the' claim 'to the extent described and to warn
others of the prior appropriation.' The comment is
obviously applicable to the asserted defects in the
declaratory statement of appellees. It, like the California requirement, had no other purpose than 'to
warn others of the prior appropriation' of the claim,
and such is the principle of constructive notice. It
-constructive notice-is the law's substitute for actual notice, and to say that it and actual notice are
equivalents._ 1uould seem to carry the self-evidence of
an axiom. Besides, in th:'is case there was unequivocal possession of the Elm Orlu and it is elementary
tha,t such possession is notice to all the ·'lcorld of the
possessor's rights thereunde1·. Simons Creek Coal
Co. v. Do?"an, 142 U. S. 417." (Emphasis supplied.)
In summary, respondent submits that, with respect to
the conflict area, it has performed every act required
to initiate and maintain a valid mining claim as against
the appellant. Appellant's own statements show that respondent has discovered valuable mineral on such area, that
it has claimed the same and has segregated the same from
the public domain since 1952, three years prior to the time
when appellant attempted to initiate a mining claim thereon,
and that it has performed the annual assessment work
thereon for every year since the claim was located. The
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only deficiency which is admitted by respondent or claimed
by appellant is the failure to record an amended or relocation notice. Respondent submits that failure to record
such a notice does not work a forfeiture of its rights under
the mining claim and further that appellant by his own
admissions had full knowledge of the extent and limits of
the claim of respondent and cannot therefore complain of
the absence of constructive notice thereof.
None of the authorities cited by appellant under Point
I of his brief are in conflict with the propositions set forth
herein. Indeed, most, if not all, of the cases support respondent's position. For the convenience of the Court, respondent will briefly summarize said cases in the order in
which they appear in appellant's brief.
The case of Shoshone Min. Co. v. Rutter, 87 Fed. 801,
177 U. S. 505, is a case similar to the instant case but does
not stand for the proposition claimed by appellant. In the
case, the prior locator, before the attachment of any rights
of the subsequent locator, initiated a new claim by a different name on top of his old location, including land not
previously covered thereby. Because of the fact that the
second claim had a different name and was regarded by
the first locator as a separate location, the subsequent locator contended that the second location was invalid in the
absence of a showing that the prior location had been abandoned. It is noted that there is some apparent merit to
this contention and that the subsequent locator's position
in said case is considerably stronger than appellant's posi-
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tion herein. The court, however, had no trouble disposing
the contentions of the subsequent locator as follows:
"There is no statute, law, rule, or regulation
which prevents locators of mining claims from relocating their own claim, and including additional
vacant ground unclaimed by other parties, under a
different name, and conveying it by the designation
of the last name." (Emphasis supplied.)

A fortiori, such an inclusion of additional land could be
made without a change of name, whether the new location
be considered an amendment or a relocation.
Pelican & Dives Min. Co. v. Snodgrass, 12 Pac. 206, is
not comparable with the instant case since the person claiming prior rights had made no location of a mining claim
at all but had merely driven a tunnel. Four years later,
after intervening locators had located the ground, he returned ~ the area and attempted to post a notice and erect
corner monuments in conflict with the intervening claim.
Appellant quotes at some length from Snyder, Mines
and Mining to the effect that some decisions sanction the
moving of boundary stakes during the period permitted for
the performance of discovery work, notwithstanding the
intervention of subsequent locators. This matter has no
relation to the amendment or relocation of a mining claim
to include vacant and unappropriated lands such as is involved herein ; and the quoted material in fact implies that
the locator could certainly move his boundary stakes in the
absence of intervening locators.
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The case of Cranford, et al. v. Gibbs, et al., 123 Utah
447, 260 P. 2d 870, while not in point on the facts, fully
supports the position of respondent on this appeal. The case
does not hold that a locator with notice may rely on a recorded Notice of Location but, to the contrary, holds that
where there is a discrepancy between the Notice of Location and the claim on the ground, the actual lines of the
claim on the ground control. Both the Cranford case and
the section in Morrison's Mining Rights referred to recite
the general rule that notices of location are to be accorded
a liberal not a technical construction and that any language
which will be general notice to subsequent prospectors will
make a sufficient description. In the instant case, of course,
appellant had full and complete notice of the claim of respondent.
The case of M eydenbauer v. Stevens, 78 Fed. 787, cited
by appellant to sustain the proposition that the recorded
~otice and the location on the ground must correspond,
actually holds as follows :
1. The statute authorizing the location of rmn1ng
claims on the public domain does not require the
posting or recordation of a notice of location.

2. If a notice is recorded which does not accord with
the location of the claim on the ground, the location on the ground will prevail and will determine
the locus of the claim.
3. Where a prior locator is in actual possession of the
ground in dispute and the subsequent locator violates such possession without color of right or
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title, the prior locator Is entitled to prevail although his location was defective.
The Court will note that this case fully sustains the contentions of respondent and, in fact, cites as controlling
Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining Co., 160 U. S. 303, cited
hereinafter.
In Hauswirth v. Butcher, 1 Pac. 714, the only issue was
whether the locator could locate a claim 2,000 feet long
instead of the maximum of 1,500 feet permitted by statute.
In Newbill v. Thurston, 4 Pac. 409, the court ruled in
favor of a subsequent locator where the prior locator had
not segregated his claim by erecting corner monuments until
after the acquisition of rights by intervening parties. In
the instant case, of course, respondent's monuments were
in place in their present position three years prior to appellant's first attempt to locate the Poison Fraction. It
is also noted that the case of Doe v. Waterloo Min. Co., 70
Fed. 455, next cited by appellant, was a retrial of the Newbill case in the federal courts. The U. S. Court ofAppeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that the prior locators should
prevail notwithstanding the failure to erect corner monuments prior to the acquisition of intervening rights, so long
as said monuments were erected within a reasonable time.
The cases of Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 527, and Sanders v. Noble, 55 Pac. 1037, likewise relate solely to the
question of whether or not a party can acquire rights as
against a posted notice of location prior to the time when
the original locator segregated his claim on the public
domain by erecting corner monuments.
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The further quotations from Cranford v. Gibbs, supra,
are not in conflict with the position contended for by respondent herein. The quotations clearly refer to the effect
of boundary changes on intervening rights. The case holds
that priority of location, that is, priority in time, cannot
be maintained if an amendment amounts to a new and different location. This is clearly the law. If appellant had
acquired his right to the area in dispute prior to the time
when the Farmer John No. 3 was purportedly amended
or relocated, respondent would not be entitled to prevail on
a motion for summary judgment. It is admitted, however,
that the amendment or relocation, if made at all, was made
some three years prior to appellant's first attempt to initiate
any rights in the disputed area.
Before closing this portion of respondent's argument,
it may be well to point out that there can be no question
as to the right of respondent to amend or relocate its claim
so as to take in territory not originally claimed so long as
there are no intervening rights to such territory. We believe this to be axiomatic. The only litigated cases on this
point, and all of the cases cited by appellant in relation
thereto, concern situations where a third party has located
the area in dispute prior to the amendment or relocation.
As said in Lindley, Volume 2, Third Edition, Section 396 :
"There is no statute, law, rule or regulation
which prevents a locator of a mining claim from
amending his location and including additional vacant ground unclaimed by other parties, or even
giving to the location a different name."
See also Section 397, which discusses the matter at length.
There is, of course, no contention herein that the dis-
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puted ground was not vacant public domain at the time the
purported change of boundaries was made, and appellant
himself attempted to initiate no rights therein until several
years thereafter.
(B)

Appellant Had No Standing in 1955 or 1956
to Initiate a Valid Mining Claim on the
Area in Conflict.

It is well established by a long and distinguished line
of authorities in virtually all the mineral bearing states
that a locator, with full knowledge that a particular tract
of land is claimed by another, may not enter such land for
the purpose of establishing a mining claim thereon while
such other person is in possession and working and mining
the claim. This rule derives from and is an equitable extension of the often quoted statement that "a mining claim
cannot be located in trespass" and is applied in situations
where a subsequent locator attempts to reap the benefits
of another's labor by resort to the technical niceties of the
mining laws.
It should be noted that the rule is applied only in possessory actions between mining claimants, such as the instant case, and not in those cases \vhere the rights of United
States or those of persons claiming under nonmineral laws
are involved. As was stated in Houck v. Jose, 72 F. Supp. 6,
affirmed 171 F. 2d 211 :
"No presumptions are indulged in favor of a
claimant, even in possession, against the United
States, but as between a locator in possession, and a
subsequent intruding locator, the law favors the
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locator who in good faith, occupies mineral lands
and does improvements on them against the intruder
who goes on the land which he knows has been located, claimed and occupied and tries to oust him.
(Citing numerous cases.)"
In the case of M' Intosh v. Price, 121 Fed. 716, the original locator had located a claim larger than was permitted
by law. The court, conceding that the claim was invalid and
void as to the excess, nevertheless held that a junior locator
could not enter upon the possession of the prior locator to
claim the excess. In so holding, the court stated:
"The policy of the mining laws of the United
States does not permit a locator to thrust out of
the possession of his discovery and the pay streak
of his claim one who has located a placer claim in
attempted compliance with the mining rules and
laws, and who is actually engaged in mining upon
that portion of his claim. A case directly decisive
of the question in Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining
Co., 160 U. S. 303, 16 Sup. Ct. 282, 40 L. Ed. 436.
In that case the Victoria Mining Company was in
possession of and was engaged in working certain
mining claims. One of its employees, discovering
what he conceived to be fatal defects in the location
notices of the claims, conceived the secret intention
of taking possession of the property for his own
benefit, secured the assistance of another, and made
locations on the ground then occupied by his employer, set stakes and posted notices, and in the night
time ousted the mining company from its possession.
The court held that such an intruder and trespasser
could not make his wrongdoing successful by asserting a flaw in the title of him against whom the
wrong had been committed. In Eners v. Boatman
and Others, 111 U. S. 357, 4 Sup. Ct. 432, 28 L. Ed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
454, the Supreme Court, affirming the decision of
the territorial court of Utah in Eilers v. Boatman,
3 Utah 167, 2 Pac. 66, held that one cannot locate
ground on which another is in the actual possession
under claim and color of right, because such ground
is not vacant and unoccupied."
In the Eilers case referred to, the Supreme Court of
Utah said:
"It is conceded by the respondents, and is doubtless true, that, as between two locators, and as affecting their rights only, one cannot locate ground
of which the other is in actual possession under claim
or color of right, because such ground would not
be vacant and unoccupied."
The contention of the subsequent locator in the Eilers
case was that the prior locator had not properly staked his
claim so as to segregate the same from the public domain.
In Gerber v. Wheeler, 115 P. 2d 100, (Idaho), without
even discussing the claimed defects in the prior location,
the court, after noting that the subsequent locator had
actual know ledge of the boundaries of the prior claim, said:
"We recently passed upon a somewhat similar
question in the case of Independence Placer M. Co.
v. Hellman, 62 Idaho ... , 109 P. 2d 1038, 1042, and
said : 'One who has actual notice, that a prior locator is claiming a tract of mining ground and has
done location work thereon and continued to do prospecting and assessment work on the property, is not
in a position to make a valid location on such property. In such case he has notice that the ground is
claimed by another and that so much of it as is
claimed and occupied is no longer public domain
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subject to location; and he may not question the
sufficiency of the original location or the character
of the original occupant's title.' [Citing cases.]"
In the case of Brown v. Murphy, 97 P. 2d 281 (California), the subsequent locator claimed, among other things,
that there was no proper evidence as to the location of any
of the prior claims and that there was no evidence that the
prior claims were staked and marked so that the boundaries
could be readily traced. The court said :
"The undisputed findings of the court in the
instant case are that the respondent was in the actual
possession and occupancy of the property after the
discovery of mineral thereon. When the appellant,
in bad faith, with full knowledge of these facts, and
without any right or color of title, ousted the respondent, and although if it may be conceded, which
we do not, that the location under which respondent
~vas in possession was invalid or defective, still he
was in actual possession after discovery, which is
essential to perfect any mineral location, and which
was the only discovery made under any location.
The land was not open and unoccupied mineral land
which warranted the appellant in the face of such
knovvledge of respondent's actual possession to invade such possession, oust respondent therefrom,
and under such entry attempt to negotiate a location
of the property. On the contrary, an intrusion under
such circumstances by appellant, not in good faith,
constituted him a naked trespasser who is in no
position to raise any issue whatever on the question
of title under which respondent held his possession
of the property."
In Ehrhart v. Bowling, 97 P. 2d 1010 (California), the
contention was that the prior locator had not adequately
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marked his claim upon the ground. The court, after noting
that the subsequent locators had often passed the prior
claims and were well acquainted with them, said :
"Having this actual knowledge, they could not
attack the location on technical grounds. It is well
settled that one who has actual knowledge of the
claims of another to mineral lands cannot, in good
faith, relocate the ground because of technical defects in the making of the location [citing numerous
cases]."
The same rule was applied, in spite of various claimed
defects in prior locations, in Pease v. Johnson, 235 P. 2d
229 (California), Little Sespe Consol. Oil Co. v. Bacigalupi,
139 Pac. 802 (California), Hayden Hill Consol. Mining Co.
v. Lincoln Mining Co., 160 P. 2d 468 (Idaho), Steele v.
Preble, 77 P. 2d 418 (Oregon), Scoggin v. Miller, 189 P. 2d
677 (Wyoming), Ninemire v. Nelson, 249 Pac. 990 (Washington).
The Supreme· Court of Utah has recently had occasion
to pass on a closely analogous question in Fuller v. Mountain
Sculpture, 6 Utah 2d 385, 314 P. 2d 842, in which case the
subsequent locator alleged certain defects in the location
notice and in the marking of the claim upon the ground.
The court said :
"It is further to be observed that the defendants,
* * * had actual notice that plaintiff claimed
the area in dispute. Therefore, even if there had
been deficiencies of a technical nature in plaintiff's
location, that furnishes no succor to defendants
* * * in attempting to establish their claim. It
is well settled that minor defects in the notices, de-
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scriptions, or procedure will not defeat the location
of a prior claimant at the instance of one having
actual notice."
In support of the last statement, the court cited, with
approval, Steele v. Preble, supra and Independence Placer
Mining Co. v. Hellman, 109 P. 2d 1038. Portions of the
opinion in the Hellman case are contained above in the
quotation from the decision in Gerber v. Wheeler, supra.
There can be no doubt in this case that appellant was
fully apprised of respondent's claim and that respondent
was in possession of the claim and mining therefrom when
appellant attempted to initiate a claim thereon. Under the
authorities cited, he was therefore not in good faith and his
acts were those of a trespasser.
(C)

Respondent Has Established a Valid Title
to the Farmer John No. 3 Claim as Against
Appellant by Reason of the Fact That it and
its Predecessors in Interest Have Held and
Worked Said Claim for a Period in Excess
of Seven Years.

Under the mining laws of the United States, a claim
to mineral lands on the public domain may be established
by location and segregation of a portion thereof, as outlined
in the preceding arguments, or such a claim may be established by holding and working a particular mining claim
for a period equal to the statute of limitations for mining
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claims of the state in which the claim is situated. Section
38 of Title 30, U. S. C., provides as follows:
"Where such person or association, they and
their grantors, have held and worked their claims
for a period equal to the time prescribed by the
statute of limitations for mining claims of the State
or Territory where the same may be situated, evidence of such possession and working of the claims
for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right
to a patent thereto under sections 21-24, 26-30, 33-48,
50-52, 71-76 of this title, in the absence of any adverse claim ; * * * "
Some courts at an early date construed this statute to
be operative only in the absence of a claim by a third party,
but the Supreme Court of the United States, the final
arbiter in such matters, has held that if a claim is so held
and worked the locator's right to a patent is complete and
is the equivalent of a valid location. In the case of Cole v.
Ralph, 252 U. S. 286, the Supreme Court said:
"The only real divergence of the opinion respecting the section [30 U. S. C. 38] has been as to
whether it is available in an adverse suit, such as
these are, or is addressed merely to the land department. Some of the courts have held it available only
in proceedings in the department * * * and
courts in greater number have held in available in
ad verse suits * * * The latter view has received the approval of this court."
In the instant case, the Farmer John No. 3 claim was
located in 1943, twelve years prior to appellant's first attempt to initiate a claim in the area. Moreover, there is no
contention herein that respondent has not performed the
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assessment work required by federal law to hold a mining
claim or has not otherwise "held and worked" the claim
continuously since 1943. In fact, appellant himself estimates
that $300,000.00 has been expended in the development of
the claim.
It is true that respondent is conceding, for the purposes of the motion for summary judgment and this appeal,
that the boundaries of the claim were changed sometime
prior to 1952. Since this is so, it could be argued that respondent may not have held and worked the same ground
for the statutory period. While we have found no cases
exactly in point, respondent contends that the statute, which
is remedial in character and designed to protect those who
in good faith develop mineral lands belonging to the United
States, was intended to lay at rest all matters relating to
the original location of a particular claim after the required
period of time had elapsed. In other words, respondent
contends that plaintiff at this date is precluded by the
statute from raising any question as to the original location
af the claim and, in addition, is precluded from raising any
question as to the movement of the boundaries thereof, at
least in the absence of a showing on his part that his rights
attached to a particula.r portion of the ground prior to the
movement of the boundaries. The undisputed fact in this
case is that appellant's rights did not so attach.
If a litigant in appellant's position were entitled to
question the efficacy of an original location or the exact
area covered thereby after the period of limitation had expired, the purpose of the statute would be thwarted and
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the benefits inte-nded to be bestowed thereby on those who
bold and work mineral bearing lands would be illusory.
Moreover, the law is well settled in this state that, in
considering whether or not to apply the particular statute
in question to a given case, the court may consider all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the case and the equities reflected thereby. Springer v. Southern Pac. Co., 67
Utah 590, 248 Pac. 819. In that case, though conceding the
lack of a lode discovery by the prior locator, the court said:
"We cannot conceive of a more flagrant disregard of the rights of one who for nearly a quarter
of a century has been in the actual, open, visible and
exclusive possession of mining claim, one who has
expended thereon many hundreds of thousands of
dollars, one who has in every respect but one complied with the mining laws * * * than is made
to appear in this case. Moreover, it is palpably clear
that the appellants [the subsequent locators] have
not entered upon the mineral lands in question for
the purpose of in good faith developing the mineral
contained therein, but have done so for the sole purpose of dispossessing the respondent and to compel
it to pay tribute to appellants * * *
"As a matter of course, the appellants contended
that the purpose they have in view and the vast
expenditure of money made by the respondent, are
wholly immaterial to this controversy. While so far
as respondent's technical rights in the mineral lands
are concerned that may be the proper vie'Y to take,
yet, when the question of the application of a remedial statute is to be considered, we think all of
the facts and circumstances to which reference has
been made are material and should be given proper
consideration."
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In this case, respondent and its predecessors in interest
have occupied and worked the subject claim for a period
in excess of fifteen years, have expended vast sums of
money thereon, and have in good faith developed and utilized the mineral rock contained therein. Respondent submits that the language of this court quoted above is applicable to the positions of the parties in the instant case
and that a court of equity should apply the statute referred
to and sustain defendant's title on that basis.
In Point II of his brief filed in this case, appellant
argues that no sufficient showing has been made to establish respondent's claim by adverse possession. In addition
to arguing facts already admitted, appellant makes only
the single point that respondent has not held and worked
the particular area now covered by the Farmer John No. 3
for seven years. As indicated above, if this issue may now
be raised by appellant, respondent must concede that, under
the admissions made for the purpose of the motion for
summary judgment, the argument in this subheading must
fail. There are, however, no disputed questions of fact
implicit in the argument as made by respondent herein.
The cases cited by appellant under Point II of its brief
do not purport to decide the question which is posed in this
argument. In the case of Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279,
the plaintiff located his claim only a few months prior to
the time defendant located an adverse claim. Moreover,
plaintiff did not remain in possession and performed only
token work on the claim.
The case of Malone v. Jackson, 137 Fed. 878, is in all
respects similar to the Meagher case. The prior locator
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located only a short time before the subsequent locator and
did not retain possession.

•

The case of California Dolomite Company v. Standridge, 275 P. 2d 823, does hold, as contended by appellant,
that a subsequent locator may make an issue of fact out of
whether the prior claim was properly located at the outset
and whether said claim has been "held and worked" for
the proper period of time. While the decision is undoubtedly
correct with respect to the issue of "holding and working,"
respondent submits that it is against the weight of authority with respect to the issues on the original location. This
Court in fact, in the case of Springer v. Southern Pac. Co.,
supra, has even refused to consider whether or not a proper
discovery was made after the passage of the period of limitations.
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CONCLUSION
For the purposes of the motion for summary judgment
below and hence on this appeal, respondent has conceded
every material fact contended for by appellant and has
shown that appellant cannot recover as a matter of law.
Appellant's claim to the disputed area, while devoid of any
legal merit, has been and continues to be damaging to respondent company and has impaired the development of
the mine on the Farmer John No. 3 claim. Respondent submits that it would be inequitable, in view of the overwhelming weight of authority on the legal propositions discussed
herein, to require Respondent to submit to the expense and
further delay which would be occasioned by a trial of this
case insofar as the same relates to the Farmer John No. 3
claim.
The judgment of the court below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
DONALD E. SCHWINN,
Attorneys for
Defendant and Respondent.
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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